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I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent developments have made it more important than ever
for United States companies to consider the impact of European Com-
munity (EC) antitrust law on their policies and practices.
The first development, the judgment of the European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ) in A. Ahistrom OY and Others v. EC Commission 1 (Wood
Pulp), issued on September 27, 1988, significantly extended the applica-
tion of EC antitrust rules to companies based outside the EC. Section
two of this Article examines the law prior to the Wood Pulp judgment.
Section three examines that judgment and its implications.
The second development is the EC's program to complete the Single
European Market (Single Market) by 1992. EC based companies will
* William Brown, a solicitor with the London law firm of Denton Hall Burgin, & War-
rens, specializes in EC law. Prior to joining Denton Hall in 1987, he worked in Brussels as a
trainee with the Legal Service of the EC Commission and in private practice.
1. 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 901 (1988).
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generally benefit from the Single Market, irrespective of the nationality
of their shareholders, whereas non-EC companies who do not have EC
subsidiaries will not necessarily enjoy the same benefits. Therefore, there
has been an increasing tendency for non-EC companies to establish joint
ventures, local subsidiaries, or to acquire shareholdings in existing com-
panies based in the EC. Section four of this Article addresses the impact
of the EC antitrust rules on this trend.
First, however, a brief summary of EC antitrust law may be useful.
EC antitrust law aims to prevent conduct by commercial entities that
adversely affects competition within the Single Market and trade between
EC Member States.2 Such conduct falls into two categories:
(1) agreements and concerted practices between two or more enterprises
and decisions of associations of enterprises; I and
(2) conduct by individual companies holding a dominant position on a
relevant market that constitutes an abuse of that dominant position.4
2. The Member States of the EC are Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.
3. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85, 1988
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 47 (Cmd. 455) 82, 107 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (original version at 298
U.N.T.S. 11). Article 85(1) states:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id.
4. Article 86 states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the com-
mon market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse
may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or unfair trading
conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading par-
ties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; and
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
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The EC Commission' enforces these provisions. It can, among
other things, impose fines of up to ten percent of the infringing parties'
worldwide sales. In addition, agreements that violate article 85(1) of the
EC Treaty may be declared void, in whole or in part, unless they have
been exempted under article 85(3) of the EC Treaty.' The decisions of
the EC Commission may be appealed to the European Court.7 However,
since this is an expensive and time consuming process, and the Court will
only reverse the Commission's decisions on certain relatively narrow
grounds. Commission decisions are usually regarded as an authoritative
source for EC antitrust law.'
II. THE LAW PRIOR TO WOOD PULP
Although the Commission applied article 86 to non-EC enterprises
on several occasions predating Wood Pulp, it has tread a more wary path
under article 85.
A. Article 85
As noted above, article 85 is not limited in its terms to EC compa-
nies. However, although article 85 has long been applied to agreements
involving both EC and non-EC enterprises, prior to Wood Pulp the rules
had not been applied to an agreement or practice involving only non-EC
enterprises.
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id. at 107-08.
5. The EC Commission is officially called the Commission of the European
Communities.
6. Article 85(3) states:
The provisions of [article 85(1)] may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of: any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; any deci-
sion or category of decisions by associations of undertakings; and any concerted
practice or category of concerted practices which contributes to improving the pro-
duction or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress,
while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to
the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question.
Id. at 107.
7. The European Court is officially called the Court of Justice of the European
Communities.
8. The Court can only vary or annul the Commission's decisions on the following
grounds: "[L]ack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, in-
fringement of the [EEC] Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application or misuse of
powers." Id. art. 173, at 136.
1990]
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The Community and the European Court jointly or alternatively
have held that the following agreements violate article 85(1):
An agreement between Eastern European foreign trade organiza-
tions and European purchasers that effectively regulated prices for sales
to the EC, imposed quotas on imports, and prevented sales to other par-
ties in Western Europe;9
An agreement between a non-EC producer and an EC distributor
that prevented the distributor from re-exporting the products to other
Member States, or prevented the products from being imported from
other Member States into the importer's territory;"°
An agreement between French and Japanese ballbearing manufac-
turers aimed at regulating imports from Japan into France and increas-
ing prices;1 and
An agreement between a German company and a Japanese supplier
whereby the German company was granted exclusive distribution rights
for the EC, thereby preventing the Japanese company from exporting to
the Community.12
All of these cases concerned imports into the Community. These
cases demonstrate that an agreement in which at least one EC enterprise
is a party, and which restricts imports into the Community, or competi-
tion within the Community, will be found to violate article 85(1).13 The
Commission, however, went further and stated that agreements that had
these effects would be violative of article 85(1) even if all of the parties to
the agreement were based outside the Community. 4 The Commission,
therefore, clearly subscribes to the "effects" doctrine: the Community
has jurisdiction to apply EC antitrust rules to parties engaging in agree-
ments or concerted practices that have the effects cited in article 85(1),
even if the practices or agreements are implemented outside the Commu-
nity. This view was not applied in practice, however, until Wood Pulp.
Article 85(1) does not generally apply to restrictions on exports
from the Community, although it can apply in exceptional cases. For
example, an agreement to buy goods on the condition that they will not
be resold in countries outside the EC would probably violate article
9. Aluminum Imports from Eastern Europe, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 92) 1 (1985).
10. Beguelin Import Co. v. S.A.G.L. Import Export, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 949.
11. Franco-Japanese Ballbearings Agreement, 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 343) 19 (1974).
12. Siemens/Fanuc, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 376) 29 (1985).
13. Preserved Mushrooms, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 29) 26, 28 (1975).
14. Notice on Imports of Japanese Products, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 111) 13 (1972).
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85(l). 11 An obligation not to export products outside the Community
will not normally affect competition in the Community or trade between
Member States unless there is a real prospect of the goods re-entering the
Community. In the Junghans case,' 6 for example, the Commission held
that the export ban did not have any effect within the Community at the
time of the decision because the double customs duty paid for products
crossing the Community frontier twice would effectively deter re-import
into the Community. 7 However, the Commission stated that this would
not necessarily be the result once the Community's free trade agreements
with the European Free Trade Association countries were concluded
(they now have been).18
It is unlikely that restrictions on exporting to the United States will
violate article 85(1). Besides possible customs duties, the cost of trans-
port will mean that, in most cases, there exists no real prospect of re-
export into the Community.
B. Article 86
The Commission may apply article 86 not only to EC subsidiaries of
non-EC companies, but also, in certain circumstances, to the non-EC
companies themselves. When an EC subsidiary abuses its dominant posi-
tion, and the actions involved are not attributable to the parent company,
the Commission's decision will be directed to the EC subsidiary. For
example, in General Motors 9 the Commission imposed fines on General
Motors Continental, a European subsidiary of the General Motors
group, for abusing its dominant position on the Belgian market.20
On the other hand, when the conduct is attributable to the non-EC
parent company, the Commission will address its decision to the parent
company.2 When both the parent company and the subsidiary are re-
sponsible for the breach, fines will be imposed on each, usually jointly
and severally. In Commercial Solvents,22 for example, the Commission
15. Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines v. EEC Commission, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1679.
16. 20 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 30) 10 (1977).
17. Id at 14.
18. Id.
19. General Motors v. EEC Commission, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1367; see also NV
Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. EEC Commission, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
3461.
20. General Motors, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1377.
21. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. EEC Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
461.
22. Commercial Solvents Corp. v. EEC Commission, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223.
1990]
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held that Commercial Solvents Corporation, a United States company
and its fifty-one percent owned Italian subsidiary, Istituto Chemioter-
apico Italiano (Istituto), held a dominant position in the Common Mar-
ket for the raw material necessary for the manufacture of ethambutol.23
Istituto's refusal of supplies of that product could be imputed to the par-
ent company because the parent company exercised control over Is-
tituto.2 4 A decision imposing fines was addressed jointly and severally to
Commercial Solvents and Istituto.25
The Commission held a parent company liable, imputing the action
of the subsidiary to the parent company because of the parent company's
control of its subsidiary. The Commission did not base its decision on
the "effects" doctrine.26
III. THE WOOD PULP CASE
In Wood Pulp, the Commission fined forty-three American and
Scandinavian businesses, including one trade association and one export
association, that were involved in the export of woodpulp to the Commu-
nity. The Commission held that these businesses infringed article 85(1)
by: (1) engaging in concerted practices on prices charged to EC custom-
ers; and (2) in the case of the United States export association, recom-
mending to its members the prices to be charged to EC customers and
producers.
These were classic violations of EC antitrust law. The only differ-
ence in this case was that all the businesses involved were based outside
the Community.27 On appeal to the European Court, the defendants ar-
gued inter alia that the Commission had no jurisdiction to apply article
85(l).28 Public international law precluded any application of article 85
to activities conducted outside the Community, even if those activities
had economic repercussions within the Community.29 Moreover, the de-
fendants claimed application of article 85 to the activities of a United
States export association would breach the public international law prin-
ciple of noninterference since it would harm the interest of the United
States in promoting exports to the Community. 30 This interest on the
23. Id. at 249-50.
24. Id. at 253-55.
25. Id. at 257.
26. Id. at 253-54.
27. A. Ahlstrom OY & Others v. EEC Commission, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 901, 938 (1988).
28. Id. at 939-40.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 940.
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part of the United States was codified in the Webb-Pomerene Act of
1918, which exempts export associations from United States antitrust
laws.31
The Court's decisions on these points are summarized below.
A. Jurisdiction to Apply Article 85
The Court held as follows:
It should be observed that an infringement of Article 85, such as the
conclusion of an agreement which has had the effect of restricting com-
petition with the Common Market, consists of conduct made up of two
elements, the formation of the agreement, decision or concerted prac-
tice and the implementation thereof. If the applicability of prohibi-
tions laid down under competition law were made to depend on the
place where the agreement, decision or concerted practice was formed,
the result would obviously be to give undertakings an easy means of
evading those prohibitions. The decisive factor is therefore the place
where it is implemented.
The producers in this case implemented their pricing agreement within
the Common Market. It is immaterial in that respect whether or not
they had recourse to subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents, or branches
within the Community in order to make their contacts with purchasers
within the Community.
Accordingly the Community's jurisdiction to apply its competition
rules to such conduct is covered by the territoriality principle as uni-
versally recognized in public international law.32
The Court, therefore, clearly held that in order for an enterprise to
be subject to article 85(1), that enterprise need not have any establish-
ment within the Community.3 3 Beyond that, however, it is difficult to
know what general conclusion to draw from the judgment. On one hand,
the judgment could be read as applying the effects doctrine. If this analy-
sis is correct, then article 85(1) could be applied not only to agreements
or practices regulating prices in the Community, but also, for example, to
an agreement between non-EC producers that one or more of them will
not sell to the EC. In that case, at least one of the parties would not be
doing business at all in the EC, but the agreement would be governed by
article 85(1) because it would undoubtedly affect competition within the
Community.
On the other hand, the judgment could be read as applying a nar-
31. Id.
32. Id. at 941.
33. Id.
1990]
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rower definition of the territorial principle of public international law.
Under this view, states have jurisdiction against foreign entities only
when the entity engages in some form of activity within their territories.
Concluding contracts with EC customers could be regarded as activity
for this purpose, but a noncompetition clause of the nature described
above would not.
The Commission has clearly adopted the views that the former in-
terpretation is the correct one and that the effects doctrine is part of
Community law.34
B. The Principle of Noninterference
One of the trade associations involved in the appeal alleged that the
Commission had violated the "known interference" principle of public
international law, whereby if a person finds himself subject to contradic-
tory requirements imposed by different states, each state is obliged to
exercise its jurisdiction with moderation. The trade association argued
that such a contradiction existed in this case between the Webb-Pomer-
ene Act and the Commission's application of article 85(1). However, the
court held, without inquiring as to the existence of such a rule in public
international law, that there were no contradictory requirements in this
case; the Webb-Pomerene Act exempted export cartels from United
States antitrust law, but did not require such cartels to be entered into in'
the first place.
IV. THE IMPACT OF 1992
As noted earlier, the Commission's 1992 Program has resulted in an
increased tendency for non-EC companies to form joint ventures or sub-
sidiaries in the EC, or to acquire shareholdings in existing companies in
the EC.
The formation by a United States company of a subsidiary in the EC
should not in itself have any implications under EC antitrust law since it
will normally increase, rather than decrease, competition. However,
joint ventures or acquisitions in existing companies may well be affected.
A. Joint Ventures
The term "joint venture" is used here to mean the formation of a
34. See Commission Decision, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 85) 1, 15 (1984); Notice on
Imports of Japanese Products, supra note 14, at 13.
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new company, by two or more commercial enterprises, to carry out a
specific economic activity or activities.
When, as is often the case, the companies establishing the joint ven-
ture are actual or potential competitors of each other in the EC, the
agreement forming the joint venture will usually be governed by article
85(1). Thus, if the agreement is to be exempted, the companies involved
must notify the EC.
A considerable body of Commission law provides guidance on the
type of joint ventures that may qualify for exemption. An examination of
these decisions is outside the scope of this Article. For present purposes
it suffices to note that joint ventures, relating solely to sales or distribu-
tion, are rarely exempted. Joint ventures involving research and develop-
ment and or production are more frequently exempted.35
The concept of potential competition is important for United States
companies. As noted above, article 85(1) will usually apply to a joint
venture formed between parties who are actual or potential competitors
in the EC.36
For a United States company to actively compete with an EC com-
pany, the United States company must be operating within the EC mar-
ket. However, potential competition on the part of a company is
interpreted broadly by the Commission. Essentially, if there is no techni-
cal or legal obstacle to its participation in the EC market, a company will
usually be treated as a potential competitor, even though the company
has never participated in the market and has no plans to do So. 37 There-
fore, United States companies considering the formation of joint ventures
with European partners should consider the applicability of EC antitrust
law to the joint venture agreement.
B. Acquisitions
EC antitrust law may also apply when a United States company ac-
quires shares in an existing EC company. The acquisition may fall under
article 85 or 86. As noted above, for article 86 to apply, the United
States company must already have a dominant position in the EC. It is
not necessary for an acquisition to be made through an EC subsidiary in
order for article 86 to apply. Europemballage and Continental Can v.
35. For a discussion of the relevant cases see L. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MAR-
KET LAW OF COMPETITION (3d ed. 1987).
36. See EEC COMM'N, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, para. 55, at 38 (1977).
37. See EEC COMM'N, THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, para. 55, at 50
(1984).
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EEC Commission,38 is the only decision in which the Commission found
an acquisition violative of article 86." In Continental Can, the subsidi-
ary did have an office in the EC. It is unclear that the court would have
reached the same decision if a different situation existed. However, if
Wood Pulp has made the effects doctrine a part of Community law, there
seems no reason why that doctrine would not apply under article 86 as
well as under article 85. Thus, a direct acquisition by a United States
company that held a dominant position in the EC, but had no place of
business there, could be found to violate article 86 if it adversely affected
competition on the EC market.
Until relatively recently, it was thought that only article 86 would
apply to acquisitions. One disadvantage of this view was that unless one
of the companies involved held a dominant position, the acquisition
would escape the antitrust rules.
However, in Philip Morris,4 the European Court virtually closed
this gap. In that case, Philip Morris acquired a 30.8 percent interest,4 1
representing 24.9 percent of the votes,42 in a competitor that held "a
dominant position in an oligopolistic market., 43 The Commission held
that the transaction did not violate article 85(1). 4 The Court upheld the
decision.45 However, the Commission and the Court indicated that a
minority holding carrying a greater percentage of votes might be gov-
erned by article 85(1).46
The implications of the Philip Morris judgment are not entirely
clear. It appears that both articles 85 and 86 may apply to minority
shareholdings that give the acquiring company the power to exercise
"material influence" over the affairs of a competitor.47 It remains un-
clear whether article 85 can apply to acquisitions of majority sharehold-
38. 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215.
39. Id. paras. 25-27, at 244-45. In this case, Continental Can Company, Inc. of New
York held, through its wholly-owned subsidiary Europemballage Corporation (Delaware) a
dominant position in the relevant market in the EC, id. at 242-43, and the acquisition by that
subsidiary of the majority of the shares of a competing company based in the EC was held to
constitute an abuse of that dominant position contrary to article 86. Id. at 242-45
40. British Am. Tobacco Co. v. EEC Commission, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4487, 4
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 24 (1988).
41. Id. para. 7, at 4569, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 53.
42. Id., 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 53.
43. Id. para. 7, at 4561, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 48.
44. Id. para. 6, at 4558-59, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 44-45.
45. Id. para. 64, at 4584, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 65.
46. See id. para. 57, at 4582, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 63.
47. See id. para. 49, at 4579, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 61; id. para. 65, at 4584, 4 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 65.
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ings or whether acquisitions of majority holdings will only be subject to
article 86 (if relevant).4"
One defect of applying articles 85 and 86 to acquisitions is that these
articles do not require prenotification to the Commission prior to com-
pletion. Thus, in the event of an adverse Commission decision after com-
pletion, the parties may be required to unwind the transaction and
retransfer the shares. They may also be subject to fines.
In part to remedy this defect, the Commission recently adopted a
regulation making prior notification of certain acquisitions compulsory.49
To require notification, the aggregate worldwide sales of the entities con-
cerned must amount to at least 5000 million European Currency Units
(ECUs) and the acquisition must result in either the merger of two or
more enterprises, or of one or more enterprises acquiring control of one
or more other enterprises.
A detailed examination of the regulation is outside the scope of this
Article. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that the Regulation
will apply to a direct or indirect acquisition by a United States company
in an EC company if the shareholding was sufficient to give the United
States company or its subsidiary, control and the combined turnover ex-
ceeded the threshold mentioned above.
V. CONCLUSION
The aggregate effect of the Wood Pulp judgment and prior case law
is that any agreement that affects competition in the supply of products
and services to the Community, and within the Community, may well be
governed by article 85(1).
This result holds true regardless of whether some or all of the com-
panies concerned are based outside the Community and are not estab-
lished within the Community. It also probably holds true whether the
restrictions on competition apply to conditions under which products or
services are exported, or to an outright restriction or prohibition of
exports.
The latter point (the position adopted by the Commission) remains
to be confirmed by the European Court. In the meantime, non-EC com-
48. In the case of majority acquisitions, the Commission's view appears to be that the
acquisition removes any competition between the parties and there is therefore no competition
that is capable of being restricted within the meaning of article 85(1). See Europemballage
Corp., 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 245.
49. Regulation 4064/89, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 395) 1 (1989).
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panies would be well advised to assume that the Commissions view is
correct.
